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I.

INTRODUCTION

This outline was prepared by Howard M. Zaritsky. Howard carefully compiled insightful
cases and comments, and I am greatly indebted to him for allowing nie to use his outline.
The past twelve months have witnessed substantial changes in the estate, gift and
generation-skipping transfer (GST) ta.--ces and in the income tax laws relating to estate plruming.
This outline summarizes the legislation, regulations, revenue mlings and procedures,
regular decisions of the Tax Comt, the Claims Comt and the courts of appeals, as well as
. selected district comi and Tax Court memorandum decisions, private rulings, notices,
announcements and other Service and Treasmy documents from the past year. 1 This outline
includes those developments reported publicly from April1, 2013 through April28, 2014.
Each category is divided by Internal Revenue ·Code section, except that special
consolidated discussions examine the various developments relating to the taxation of family
pruinerships and LLCs and charitable remainder trusts.

II.

ESTATE TAXES
A.

Code§ 2010. Unified Credit; Portability

1.

IRS Permits Late Estate Tax Returns to Elect Portability for Estates
of Decedents Dying Before 2014. Rev. Proc. 2014-18, 2014-7 I.R.B.
513 (Feb. 10, 2014)

Section 2010(c)(5)(A) specifically provides that a portability election is
effective only if made on a Fotm 706 that is filed within the time prescribed by law (including extensions) for filing such return. Temp. Regs.
§ 20.2010-2T(a)(l) states that an estate that elects pmtability will be considered to be required to file a return under Section 6018(a), even if the
gross estate is below the filing threshold ($5.340 million in 2014). Accordingly, the due date of an estate tax retmn required to elect portability
is nine months after the decedent's date of death, or the last day of the period covered by an extension (if an extension of time for filing has been
obtained). Regs. § 301.9100-3 allows the IRS to grant discretionary extensions of the time in which to make elections whose due dates are pre1

Private letter mlings (PLRs) and technical advice memoranda (TAMs) are not legal precedents. Code §
6110(k)(3). They may, however, show how the Service might address a similar case, and they have been cited and
discussed by several courts. See, e.g., Wolpaw v. Comm'r, 747 F.3d 787 (6th Cir. 1995), rev'g T.C. Memo. 1993322 (taxpayers can rely on 20-year old PLR, absent definitive regulations); Estate of Blacliford v. Comm 'r, 77 T.C.
1246 (1982) (noting that the Service litigation position was contnuy to a prior PLR); Xerox Corp. v. U.S., 656 F.2d
659 (Ct. Cl. 1981) (stating that PLRs are useful in ascettaining the scope of the doctrine adopted by the Service and
demonstrating its continued and consistent application by the Service); Fanning v. U.S., 568 F.Supp. 823 (B.D.
Wash. 1983) (noting that a distinction between the facts of the instant case and those of prior cases had been cited in
· a TAM, and that TAMs are often relied upon by the courts).
All references to "Code" are to the Intemal Revenue Code of 1986, as amended to date, unless otherwise
specifically indicated. References to "Regs" are to the regulations of the Treasury Department, unless otherwise
.specifically indicated.

scribed by regulation or other administrative guidance, rather than by the
Code. The due date for electing portability for those estates required to
file an estate tax return under Section6018(a) is prescribed by statute, but
the due date for electing portability for those estates not otherwise required to file an estate tax retmn is provided by regulation. Temp. Treas.
Reg. § 20.2010-2T(a). Therefore, the executor of an estate that is under
the filing threshold should be able to seek a discretionary extension of the
time for making the portability election under Regs. § 301.9100-3. This
discretionary relief will be granted if the taxpayer establishes to the satisfaction of the Commissioner that the taxpayer acted reasonably and in
good faith and that the grant of relief will not prejudice the interests of the
government. Normally, relief under Regs. § 301.9100w3 requires that the
taxpayer file a request for a private letter niling, and pay a substantial filing fee. Rev. Proc. 2014-18, however, provides a simpler alternate procedure for obtaining a discretionary extension of the time for flling an estate
tax return to elect portability, if the estate was not otherwise required to
file an estate tax return. Rev. Proc. 2014-18 applies if: (a) The taxpayer is
the executor of the estate of a decedent who died after December 31, 2010
and before January 1, 2014, leaving a smviving spouse; (b) The smviving
spouse was a citizen or resident of the United States on the date of death;
(c) The taxpayer is not required to file an estate tax retm11 under Section
6018(a) (as determined based on the value of the gross estate and adjusted
taxable gifts, without regard to portability; (d) The taxpayer did not file a
timely estat~ tax return to elect portability; (e) The ta-x:payer files a complete and properly-prepared federal estate tax return on or before December 31, 2014 (An estate tax return is considered complete and properly
prepared if it is prepared in accordance with Temp. Regs. § 20.20102T(a)(7)); and (f) The taxpayer states at the top of the retmn that it is
"FILED PURSUANT TO REV. PROC. 2014-18 TO ELECT PORTABILITY UNDER§ 2010(c)(5)(A)." A taxpayer who meets these requirements
will be deemed to meet the requirements for relief under Regs. §
301.9100-3 and will be allowed an extension of the time for electing p01tability. For purposes of electing portability, the taxpayer's estate tax return will be considered to have been timely filed in accordance with the
regulations. The taxpayer will receive an estate tax closing letter acknowledging receipt of the taxpayer's Form 706. A taxpayer who does
not meet all of these requirements can still seek a discretionary extension
of the time within which to elect pmtability, by filing a private ruling request under Regs. § 301.9100-3. See Rev. Proc. 2014~1, 2014~1 I.R.B. 1
(or its successors). This would apply to estates of decedents who died after December 31, 2013. A taxpayer who actually flied a timely estate tax
retmn does not usually need to take advantage of Rev. Proc. 2014-18, because the mere filing of the retmn is deemed to be an election of portability. Temp. Treas. Regs. § 20.2010-2T(a)(3)(i)). A timely return can avoid
the election of pmtability only by making an affirmative statement that
portability is not desired. Id. Relief under Rev. Pro c. 2014-18 is "null and
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void" if it is ultimately determined that the taxpayer was required to file an
estate tax return under Section 6018(a), based on the value of the grossestate and taking into account any taxable gifts. The smviving spouse (or his
or her executor) must file a claim for a credit or refund of an overpayment
of tax by reason of a portability election made on a late return pursuant to
Rev. Proc. 2014-8, before the regular limitations period of two-years after
the payment of the tax or three-years after the filing of the retum. Rev.
Proc. 2014-18 is effective January 27, 2014. Until January 1, 2015, no
private rulings under Regs.§ 301.9100-3 will be issued for an extension of
the time to elect portability with respect to an estate that qualifies under
Rev. Proc. 2014-18. An executor who has a private letter ruling request
pending on January 27, 2014 and who would otherwise qualify under this
revenue procedure may rely on the procedure, withdraw the letter ruling
request and-receive a refund of its user fee. Such ruling requests will be
processed, however, unless the executor withdraws the request before
March 10, 2014, or the earlier date on which the letter ruling is actually is~
sued.

2.

Basic Exclusion Amount Adjusted for Inflation. Rev. Proc.
3.32, 2013-47 I.R.B. 537 (Nov. 18, 2013)

2013~35,

§

The IRS annual inflation adjustments for tax year 2014 include an increase
of the basic exclusion amount to $5.34 million, from $5.25 million in
2013.

3.

Extensions Granted to Make Portability Election. PLR 201414001
(April4, 2014); 201410013 (March 7, 2014); 201406004 (Feb. 7, 2014);
201407002 (Feb. 14, 2014)
The IRS granted an estate a discretionary extension to make a portability
election m1der Section 2010(c)(5)(A) to an estate that failed to file an estate tax retum and that was below the filing threshold. In each case, the
decedent's executor did not file a Form 706 to make the portability election before the required deadline. The estate discovered its failure to elect
portability after the due date for making the election. The personal representative represented that the value of the decedent's gross estate was less
than the bask exclusion amount in the year of death and that during his
lifetime, the decedent made no taxable gifts.
The IRS granted an extension · of time pursuant· to Regs. §
301.91 00~3 to elect portability of the decedent's DSUE amount pursuant to
Section 2010(c)(5)(A). The IRS noted that Temp. Regs. § 20.2010~
2T(a)(l) provides that an estate that elects portability will be considered,
for purposes of estate tax pmposes to be required to file a retmn under
Section 6018(a), so that the due date of the return required to elect portability is 9 months after the decedent's date of death or ·the last day of the
period covered by an extension (if an extension of time for filing has been
obtained). Regs. § 301.9100-l(c) provides that the IRS may grant a rea3

sonable extension of time to make a regulatory election, if the taxpayer
provides evidence to establish to the satisfaction of the IRS that the tax. payer acted reasonably and in good faith, and that granting relief will not
prejudice the interests of the govemment. A taxpayer is deemed to have
acted reasonably and in good faith if the taxpayer reasonably 1;elied on a
qualified tax professional, and the professional failed to make, or advise
the ta'\:payer to malce, the election. Regs. § 301.9100-3(b)(1)(v). Temp.
Regs. § 20.2010-2T(a) specify that the portability election must be made
on a timely-filed Form 706, and for estates not required to file an estate
tax return under Section 6018, the portability election is a regulatory election. Therefore, the IRS granted an extension of time of 120 days from the
date of this letter in which to elect portability undet Section. 201 0(c)( 5).
Note. This is less important during 2014, in light of Rev. Proc.
2014-18,2014-7 I.R.B. 513 (Feb. 10, 2014).
B.

Code §§ 2031, 2032, 2032A and 7520. Valuation
1.

No Discounts Allowed for Marital Trust Assets When Trust Distributions Had been Frozen by Trustee or For Suits Against the Decedent's
Estate and the Marital Trusts. Estate of Foster v. Comm=r, _
Fed.Appx. _ , 2014 WL 1229928 (9th Cir. March 26, 2014), a.ff'g T.C.
Memo. 2011-95
The estate of the decedent, Ellen D. Foster, was involved in complex litigation stemming from the collapse ofF&G, a successful mail-order horticulture business founded by her husband, Thomas S. Foster, that had re~
lied heavily on a sweepstakes program as part of its direct mail advertising. In 1995, Thomas2 sold most of his shares to the company=s ESOP,
which bought them with a $70 million loan from F&G, which had, in tum,
borrowed the money from four institutional lenders. Thomas, who then
died in 1996, leaving his estate to three marital trusts for the decedent's
lifetime benefit. Ellen could withdraw all of the principal of one trust
(Marital Trust# 3) at any time. Northern Trust Company and Ellen were
the co-trustees of the marital trusts and togethei· could invade principal for
Ellen's benefit. In 1998, F&G began experiencing financial trouble, its
earnings declined, and it fell into violation of the financial covenants of
the ESOP loans. The ESOP lenders (including Northern Tmst) asked
F&G to restn1cture the ESOP loans, which had been unsecured, to give the
lenders a security interest in F&G's assets. Ellen withdrew $12 million
from Marital Trust# 3, and then lent $6.8 million to F&G. The ESOP
beneficiaries sued U.S. Trust and Thomas (and Ellen, as executrix of
Thomas's estate), for breach of fiduciary duty. Northem Trust unilaterally
froze Ellen's right to withdraw the principal of Marital Tmst # 3. h1 2003,

2

References to parties by their first names are for convenience only, and are not to indicate either disrespect or a
personal relationship between the party and the author.
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the court granted summary judgment to Ellen, because her Thomas's estate had been closed and no judgment could be enforced against her in her
·fiduciary capacity. The comi left open the possibility that the plaintiffs
could proceed against Ellen as a co-tmstee of the marital trusts, if they
could establish that Thomas had committed a breach of fiduciary duty.
The court later held for the defendants, finding no such breach. The ESOP
plaintiffs appealed to the Comt of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, which
ultimately affirmed. Ellen died while the appeal was pending. Her coexecutors and the co-tmstees of the marital tmsts entered into a settlement
agreement whereby the ESOP plaintiffs released their claims against the
estate. The decedent's estate also sued both Northern Trust and an attorney for breach of fiduciary duty, conflicts of interest, and malpractice,
with respect to the prior transactions. The estate informed the IRS that the
value of these claims were additionaJ assets of the estate. The suit against
the attomey was later settled for $850,000 and the suit against Northern
Trust was settled for $17 million. The estate valued the marital trust's
with a 29 p_ercent discount for the risks of litigation respecting the suits
against the decedent and the trusts. The estate valued the lawsuit at
$33,000. The IRS assessed a deficiency based on the inclusion in the
gross estate of the value of the claims against the former attorney and
Northern Tmst, and denial of the deduction for the value of the claims
against the decedent. ·
The Tax Court (Judge Cohen), held that in valuing the marital
trusts for estate tax purposes, the tmst assets were not subject to discount
for hazards of litigation, nor were they subject to discounts for lack of
marketability and control as result of a freeze imposed by co-tmstee on
withdrawal of trust assets. The court noted that the litigation could not
have affected a buyer;:::;s rights in the marital trust assets, because the district court had already mled in favor of the decedent before her death. The
estate could, therefore, have transferred the marital trust assets to a buyer
free of the claim, because the ESOP beneficiaries had not filed a stay of
judgment pending appeal. The comt also valued the claim by the decedent=s estate against the fmmer attorney and Northern Trust at $930,000,
rejecting both the IRS's claimed $5.1 million valuation and the estate's
claimed $33,000 valuation. The court held that the estate could deduct its
actual litigation expenses tmder Section2053.
The Ninth Circuit (Judges Callahan, Smith and Hellerstein) affilmed per curiam, in an unpublished opinion, holding that the Tax Court
had not erred in refusing to apply discounts for hazards of litigation, lack
of control, or lack of marketability, noting that the plaintiffs in the lawsuit
did not seek to recover specific, unique assets from the defendants, and the
lawsuit did not cloud the title of the trust assets. A hypothetical buyer of
the trust assets would not, the court noted, become a defendant in the lawsuit, so there was no basis for a hazards of litigation discount. Citing
Shackleford v. United States, 262 FJd 1028, 1031 (9th Cir. 2001). Similarly, the court sustained the Tax Court's refusal to apply discounts for
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lack of control and lack of marketability, because while there the freeze on
distributions from the trust was not being strictly enforced. Finally, the
·court agreed that the Tax Court had properly rejected the estate's argmnent
that the estimated date-of-death value of the ESOP beneficiaries' lawsuit
was deductible as a claim against the estate, noting that the lawsuit was
disputed on the date of death, and that post-death events may be considered in computing the allowable deduction. See Estate of Saunders v.
Comm'r, _F.3d_, 2014 WL 949246, at *4 (9th Cir., 2014).

2.

Holding Company Valued Under Net Asset Value Method, Rather
than Capitalized Income; Limited Discount for Built-In Capital Gain
Allowed .. Estate of Richmond v. Comm'r, T.C. Memo. 2014-26 (Feb.
11, 2014)
At the time of her death, Helen P. Richmond owned a 23.44-percent interest in Pearson Holding Company (PHC), a 76-year-old family-owned investment holding C corporation, the assets of which on the date of death
were over $52 million of publicly traded securities. The company paid
dividends annually to its shareholders. Were the underlying securities
sold on the date of death, the company would recognize a $18 million capital gains tax. The turn-over of the company's holdings was quite slow,
averaging only 1.4 percent per year. The decedent's estate had its accountants value the stock, and the accountants applied the capitalized dividend approach to produce a $3.1 million value for the decedent's interest.
The accountant was not a certified valuation expert and provided the estate
with an unsigned draft report docun1enting his conclusions. Although the
estate never· received a signed final report, it, nevertheless~ used the repmt' s value conclusion for its estate tax filing. On examination, the IRS
valued the company under the net asset valuation approach, which valued
the decedent's interest at $9.2 million. The IRS also declined to allow a
discount for· the built-in capital gains tax. The IRS assessed a $2.9 million
deficiency and a 40-percent gross valuation misstatement penalty.
The Tax Court (Judge Gustafson) held that the value of the decedent's stock was $6.5 million, and sustained the imposition of an accuracy-related penalty. At trial, the estate's expert (a different expert from the
one on whose work the estate tax return had been based) applied the capitalized dividend approach and valued the decedent's interest at just over
$5 million, and then applied a net asset valuation as corroboration. The
IRS's expert applied a net asset value approach, producing a $7.3 million
value for the decedent's interest, after a 6-percent discount for lack of control, a 15-percent built-in gain tax liability discount, and a 21-percent discount for lack of marketability. The comt reJected the capitalization-ofdividends method, because it relies entirely on estimates of future earnings, whereas the net asset valuation method relies on "concrete and reliable" actual market prices publicly traded securities constituting the company's portfolio. Fmthermore, the capitalization-of-dividends approach
assumes that a potential investor will look only at the potential dividend
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stream, but any reasonable investor would recognize that the company's
assets are completely marketable and liquid, and that they are worth $52
million. With respect to the built-in gain discount, the court refused to use
a dollar-for-dollar discount "in a case like the present one," presumably
because the·assets were entirely publicly-traded securities and the company sold them only sparingly. The court rejected both the estate's and the
IRS's methods of calculating the discount, holding that the better approach
was to assume a 20- to 30-year holding period, based on the average turnove.r of the securities, and adjusting the discount for the time over which
the assets would be sold. The court· found the IRS $7.8 million discount
closer to the mark. The court then allowed a 7.75-percent discount for
lack of control and a 32.1-percent discount for lack of marketability, essentially averaging the discmmts from various studies cited by the IRS and
the estate. The court also sustained the accur.acy related penalty under
Section 6662, finding the estate failed to demonstrate good faith or reasonable cause, because it used an unsigned draft report prepared by its accountant as the basis for its valuation, and because the accountant was not
a certified appraiser.
Note. The court is correct that holding companies are traditionally
valued by the net asset valuation method, and that this seems especially
reasonable when the underlying assets are readily marketable. On the
built-in gain discount, however, the court's approach differs from that
adopted in Estate of Dunn v. Comm 'r, TC Memo. 2000-12, rev 'd andre- .
manded, 30.1 F.3d 339 (5th Cir. 2002); Estate of Jelke v. Comm 'r, TC
Memo. 2005-131, rev'd and remanded, 507 F.3d 1317 (11th Cir. 2007),
reh'g en bane denied, 277 Fed. Appx. 977 (Table) (11th Cir. 2008), cert.
denied, 555 U.S. 826 (2008); and Estate of Jameson v. Comm 'r, TC
Memo. 1999-43.
·
3.

Tax Court Values LLC Interest as Membership Interest, Rather than
Assignee Interest, and Excludes Taxpayer's Appraisal For Not Complying With Expert Witness Rules. Estate of Tanenblatt v. Comm'r,
T.C. Memo. 2013-263 (Nov. 18, 2013)
Diane Tanenblatt's estate included the assets owned by her revocable
trust, including a 16.667-percent interest in an LLC that held as its principal asset a 10-story commercial building in New York City. The estate
obtained professional appraisals of the underlying real estate and the LLC
interests. The property appraisal valued the real estate at $20.6 million,
and the LLC appraisal valued the 16.667-percent interest with a 20percent discount for lack of control and a 35-percent discount for lack of
marketability, resulting in a net value of $1.79 million for the estate's LLC
interest. The IRS accepted the value of the underlying property, but reduced the discounts to 10 percent for lack of control and 20 percent for
lack of marketability, resulting in a value of $2.48 million for the LLC interest. The estate then retained another appraiser to revalue the LLC interest, and she reduced it:? value to $1.04 million. The estate refened to the

7

second appraisal in and attached a copy of the second appraisal to its Tax
Court petition. At trial, the estate could not obtain the testimony of the
second appraiser, but it argued that attaching the appraisal to its petition
constituted a stipulation by the IRS to it as evidence.
The Tax Comi (Judge Halpem) refused to admit the second appraisal into evidence, because the estate did not submit and serve a copy of
the appraisal repo1i, as required by Rule 143(g), Tax Coirrt Rules of Practice and Procedure, and the comt's standing pretrial order. The comi stated that the estate's counsel told the court that the estate was embroiled in a .
fee dispute with the appraiser, and could not get the appraiser to testify.
The court stated that the appraisal could not be admitted unless the ap- ·
praiser testified and was subject to cross-examination and that Tax Court
Rule 91 does not require that the IRS stipulate to an appraisal merely because it was attached to the petition. The court held that the rules on stipulations do not overrule the rules on expeli testimony, and that the couti
always has the final authority to decide what is acceptable expe1i testimo~
ny. The comi then accepted the opinion of the IRS's expert regarding the
value of the. underlying prope1iy, and allowed discom1ts of 10 percent for
lack of control and 26 percent for lack of marketability, resulting in a $2.3
million valltation for the estate's LLC interest. The comi also held that the
estate's interest was a membership i:ntetest, rather than an assignee's inter~
est, despite the fact that the LLC operating agreement stated that a non~
family member transferee could not become a member without the unanimous approval of all of the members, and despite the fact that the decedent
had transferred her membership interest to her revocable trust. The comi
noted that Section 2038' includes the assets of the revocable trust in the decedent's gross estate as if she had owned them herself.

4.

Tax. Court Rejects Estate's Valuation of Controlling Interest in LLC
Holding Liquid Assets. Estate of Koons v. Comm'r, T.C. Memo. 201394 (April9, 2013)
The decedent, John F. Koons, III, created Central Investments Corp~,
which established and ran a soft drinks vending machine business. He
made a large series of gifts of stock of Central to various family members,
including his four children, his many grandchildren, and his three exwives. Less than three months before his death, the decedent sold the operations to Pepsi for $400 million, to settle a dispute with the soft-drink:
company. Central Investments then created Central Investments, LLC
("the LLC"), to hold and invest the sales proceeds. The shareholders of
Central Investments entered into a Stock Purchase Agreement that: (a) required-the company to distribute the LLC membership interests to the
shareholders; (b) required the redemption of the interests of several of the
donees after the decedent's death; (c) limited discretionary distributions to
30 percent of"the excess of 'distributable cash;'" (d) permitted removal of
the 30-percent limitation by a majority vote; -and (e) required a 75-percent
vote for any member to transfer his or her interests to a non-family mem8

ber. The redemptions left the decedent's estate with a 70.42-percent voting interest in the LLC, which then held approximately $351 million of assets, of which $322 million was in cash, and had a net asset value, after liabilities, of approximately $318 million. The estate valued its interests in
the LLC with a 31.7-percent discount (a 26.6~percent discount for lack of
marketability, a four-percent discount for post-sale contingent liabilities,
and a three-percent discount for the 75-percent vote required to transfer interests outside ofthe family).
The Tax Court (Judge Morrison) held for tb,e IRS, finding that the
appmpriate discount was 7. 5 percent, rather than 31.7 percent, and that the
loan interest was not deductible. The court strongly favored and adopted
the views of the IRS's expert, Prof. Mukesh Bajaj, ignored the 30-percent
discretionary distribution limitation, be.cause a simple majority vote could ·
remove it He also noted that the LLC's underlying assets were overwhelmingly liquid, so a 70.42-percent owner could distribute most of
these assets without liquidating the entity. These facts made the typical
restricted stock transaction studies inapplicable, the IRS expeli contended,
leaving an appropriate discount of 7.5 percent. The comt noted that the
estate's expert failed to consider that the discretionary distribution limitations could be overcome with a simple majority vote allowing the 70.42percent owner to distribute much of the underlying liquid assets. The
comt stated that the IRS's expert's views were based on "experience and
connnon sense," and that he anived at the more accurate valuation, in part
because (a) the estate's expe1t used a regression equation derived from an
evaluation of 88 businesses engaged in mainly active businesses as opposed to holding cash assets; (b) the estate's expe1t explained only onethird of the variation in the discounts in the ownership interests in the 88
companies; (c) the estate's calculation involved ownership of minority interests; and (d) the estate's expe1t overestimated the relationship between
block size and the valuation discount.

5.

Special Use Farm Value Interest Rates Set for 2012 and 2013. Rev.
Rul. 2013-19, 2013-39 I.R.B. 240 (Sept. 23, 2013)
The interest rates by farm credit system territories to be used in computing
the special use value of farm real property for which an election is made
m1der Section 2032A are listed for estates of decedents dying in 2013.

6.

Section 2032A Limitation Adjusted for Inflation. Rev. Proc. 2013-35,
§ 3.33, 2013-47 I.R.B. 537 (Nov. 18, 2013)
An estate can reduce the estate tax value of qualifying real property used
in a farm· or business and valued under Section 2032A, by up to
$1,090,000 for estates of decedents dying in 2014.
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C.

Code § 2036-2038. Retained Life Estate or Power to Alter Beneficial Enjoyment
Assets Transferred to GRAT and QPRT Included in Deceased Grantor's
Gross Estate Und.er Section 2036(a). Estate of Trombetta v. Comm'r, T.C.
Memo. 2013-234 (Oct. 21, 2013)
Helen A. Trombetta created a 15-year GRAT and a 15-year QPRT. The GRAT
was requhed to pay Helen $75~000 a year~ increased by four percent per annum,
for 15 years, and then distribute the remainder to Helen's children or grandchildren. The trustees could also distribute any excess income above the annuity obligation to Helen. During the tenn of the trust, the payments were most often in
amounts other than the required annuity, either larger or smaller. In 2005, Helen
concluded that her health was failing and so she unilaterally reduced the .trust
terms to 156 months. Helen's QPRT also was to continue originally for 180
months, and at this time Helen amended the QPRT to requite that the trust create
a "charitable remainder unitary trust." The trustee of the QPRT did, after Helen's
death, create a charitable remainder unitrust with a five-year term and a 19.9105percent unitrust amount.
The Tax Court (Judge Cohen) held that the assets of the two trusts were
includible in Helen's gross estate under Section 2036(a) and 2035, because of her
interests in the trusts. The court held that the transfer to the GRAT was not abona fide sale for adequate and full consideration, because the consideration was not
equal to the 'value of the transfened assets (as proven by the gift tax return) and
because the transfers were not a bona fide sale. The transfers were not bona fide
sales because the trust was prepared without any meaningful negotiation or bargaining; Helen dictated the fmm and operation of the trust and exercised control
over the trust~ s activities. Also, there was no legitimate and significant nontax
reasons for the transfer. The court also held that Helen impliedly retained the
right to possession or enjoyment of the entire GRAT trust fund, noting that she
made all decisions with respect to the trust assets and the co-trustees generally did
whatever she directed them to do. Furthermore, Helen had sole signatory authority with respect to the disposition of the properties, and she had 50 percent of the
voting power regarding distributions of additional income to l;lerself. The court
also held that Helen's relinquishment of part of her annuity interest within three
years of her death caused the property to be inclu,dible in her gross estate also lmder Section 2035. The court rejected the contention that only the rental value of
the residence held by the QPRT was includible in Helen's gross estate. The comt
noted that Section 2036(a) includes the value of the entire m1derlying asset if the
transferor retains for life (or a term that does not end before death) a right to the
personal use of that asset. Estate of Disbrow v. Comm 'r, T.C. Memo. 2006-34.
Helen had the right to live in and actually did live in .the property held by the
QPRT, and it is includible in her gross estate.
Note. The comt also held that the estate was entitled to deduct its obligation under a mortgage on the propmty held by the GRAT, because it established
that the decedent was personally liable on that debt. The· court denied the deduction for the remainder interest in the charitable remainder trust created ftoni the
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QPRT, because the trustees had no authority to create that trust 1.mder the terms of
the trust instrument.

D.

Code§§ 2056,2044,2519,2523, 2207A. Marital Deduction

1.

(

Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA) Unconstitutionally Denies Estate
Tax Marital Deduction to Otherwise Legally Married Same-Sex Couple. Windsor v. United States, 570 U.S. _ , 2013 WL 3196928, 133
S.Ct. 2675, 186 L.Ed.2d 808 (S.Ct. Jt.me 27, 2013), ajf'g 699 F.3d 169 (2d
Cir., 2012), ajj'g 833 F.Supp.2d 394 (S.D. N.Y., 2012)
Edie met arid established a committed relationship with Thea in 1963, and
they lived together until Thea's death in 2009. The couple registered as
domestic partners in New York City, when that became available in 1993.
They married in Canada in 2007, and New York law recognized the validity of that mall'iage. Thea's executor (Edie) filed an estate tax return
claiming the estate tax marital deduction, but the Service denied the deduction, based on DOMA. Edie paid the tax and sued for a refmid and· a
declaration that section 3 of DOMA violates the Equal Protection Clause
of the Fifth Amendment. Attorney General Eric Holder announced that
the Department of Justice would no longer defend DOMA's constitutionality, because he and the President believed that a heightened standard of
scrutiny applied to classifications based on sexual orientation, and that
Section 3 of DOMA failed under this standard. Given the Attorney General's decision not to enforce DOMA, the Bipartisan Legal Advisory
Gmup of the U.S. House of Representatives ("BLAG") was allowed to intervene in the suit and to defend the constitutionality of the statute.
The U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York
(Judge Jones) granted summary judgment in favor of Windsor, and found
that the application of DOMA to deny the estate tax marital deduction was
unconstitutional. The Second Circuit (Chief Judge Jacobs) affirmed, with
1 judge dissenting in part and concurring in pali. The U.S. Supreme Court
granted certiotari.
A divided U.S. Supreme.Couli affirmed and struck down section 3
of DOMA, but without addressing the appropriate standard of equal pro- ·
tection review. Justice Kennedy wrote the majority opinion, in which Justices Ginsburg, Breyer, Sotomayor, and Kagan joined. Chief Justice Rob. erts filed a dissent; Justice Scalia filed a dissent iri. which Justice Thomas
joined and in which Chief Justice Roberts joined in part; and Justice Alito
wrote a dissent in which Justice Thomas joined in part. The Court first
held that it had jurisdiction to consider the case, despite the refusal of the
U.S. Attomey General to defend DOMA. Article 3, Section 2 of the U.S.
Constitution provides that the Supreme Court cannot issue advisory opin~
ions - it may only hear a case or controversy. The Court explained that
there was clearly a case or controversy in the U.S. District Coul't, because
a taxpayer·was challenging the collection of a specific tax assessment as
being unconstitutional. Despite the decision of the Attomey General not
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·to defend DOMA's definition of maniage, the United States retained a
sufficient stake in the outcome to support Constitutional jurisdiction on
appeal. The government had not yet returned to the plaintiff the estate tax
she had paid, and that refund was "a real and immediate economic injury"
to the government, whether or not the government decided to defend
DOMA. Quoting Hein v. Freedom From Religion Foundation, Inc., 551
U.S. 587 (2007). The Court acknowledged that, even when there is a constitutional case or controversy, "prudent concems" conditions judicial review on a finding of "concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the court so largely depends for illumination of
difficult constitutional questions."· These concerns, however, can be outweighed by such co1.mtervailing considerations as the extent to which adversarial presentation of the issues is ensured by the participation of amici
curiae prepared to defend with vigor the legislative act's constitutionality.
In this context, BLAG's defense ofDOMA's definition of marriage satis~
fied the prudential concems that otherwise might make the Court reluctant
to hear an appeal from a decision with which the principal parties agree.
Thus, the Court held that it could properly decide the case.
The Court then held that DOMA unconstitutionally deprived persons of equal liberty in violation of the Fifth Amendment. The opinion of
the majori.ty:appears to rely both on the requirement of Federalism- that
certain actions and subjects are the domain of the states, rather than the
federal govemment - and equal protection. The Comt noted that the
states, not the federal government, have historically and traditionally defined and regulated marriage, and that state responsibilities for defining
and regulating marriage date to the beginning of the country: for "when
the Constitution was adopted the common understanding was that the domestic relations of husband and wife and parent and child were matters reserved to the States.'' Quoting Ohio ex rel. Popovici v. Agler, 280 U. S.
379, 383-384 (1930). The Comt stressed the special nature of the marital
relation, stating:
The States' interest in defining and regulating the
marital relation, subject to constitutional guarantees, stems
from the understanding that marriage is more than a routine
classification for purposes of certain statutory benefits. Private, consensual sexual intimacy between two adult persons
of the same sex may nbt be punished by the State, and it
can form "but one element in a personal bond that is more
ep.during." Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 567, 123 S.Ct.
2472, 156 L.Ed.2d 508 (2003). By its recognition of the va~
lidity of same-sex marriages perf01med in other jurisdictions and then by authorizing same-sex unions and samesex marriages, New York sought to give further protection
and dignity to that bond. For same-sex couples who wished
to be married, the State acted to give their lawful conduct a
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lawful status. This status is a far-reaching legal acknowledgment of the intimate relationship between two people, a
relationship deemed by the State worthy of dignity in the
comn1Unity equal with all other maniages. It reflects both
the community's considered perspective on the historical
roots of the institution of maniage and its evolving understanding of the meaning of equality. 133 S.Ct. 2675, at
2692.
DOMA, the Court stated, rejects the decisions of some states to give a parti_cular class of couples the right to marry. The resulting injury and indignity is a deprivation of an essential part of the liberty protected by the
Fifth Amendment. Th~-Comt stated:
DOMA seeks to injure the very class New York
seeks to protect. By doing so it violates basic due process
and equal' protection principles applicable to the Federal
Government. See U.S. Const., Amdt. 5; Bolling v. Shmpe,
347 U.S. 497 (1954). The Constitution's guarantee of
equality "must at the very least mean that a bare congressional desire to hru.m a politically unpopular group cannot"
justify disparate treatment of that group. Department ofAgriculture v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 534-535 (1973). In deteqnining whether a law is motived by an improper animus
or purpose, "[d]iscriminations ,of an unusual character" especially require careful consideration. Supra, at 19 (quoting
Romer, supra, at 633). DOMA cannot survive 1.mder these
principles. 133 S.Ct. 2675, at 2693.
The Court held that DOMA's principal effect was to identify and make
unequal a subset of state-sanctioned marriages, and to deprive some couples married under the laws of their state, but not others, of both rights and
responsibilities. This would create two contradictory marriage regimes
within the same state and force same-sex couples to live as married for the
purpose of state law, but unmanied for the pmpose of federal law. This,
the comt stated, would reduce the stability and predictability of basic personal relations the state deemed it appropriate to protect. The Court, appearing to blend the requirements of equal protection and Federalism, then
concluded that:
The class to which DOMA directs its restrictions
and restraints ru.·e those persons who ru.·e joined in same-sex
marriages made lawful by the State. DOMA singles out a
class of persons deemed by a State entitled to recognition
and protection to enhance their own liberty. It imposes a
disability on the class by refusing to acknowledge a ·status
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the State finds to be dignified and proper. DOMA instructs
all federal officials, and indeed all persons with whom
same-sex couples interact, including their own children,
that their marriage is less wmthy than the marriages of others. The federal statute is invalid, for no legitimate purpose
overcomes the purpose and effect to disparage and to injure
those whom the State, by its marriage laws, sought to protect in personhood and dignity. By seeking to displace this
protection and treating those persons as living in marriages
less respected than others, the federal statute is in violation
of the Fifth Amendment. This opinion and its holding are
confmed to those lawful marriages. 133 S.Ct. 2675, at
2695.
There were three separate dissenting opinions. Chief Justice Roberts argued that the Court lacked jurisdiction to review the decisions of the Second Circuit,. because there was no case or controversy. On the merits, the
Chief Justice stated that he believed that Congress acted constitutionally in
passing DOMA, because of the national interests in uniformity and stability in the application of federal laws. He distinguished the issue of samesex marriage from other subjects on which state mal.Tiage laws may differ, ·
finding the gender of the parties to be too fundamental to permit state-bystate variations. Justice Scalia's long dissent contended that the majority
had overreached and attempted to replace the proper decision of the Congress with its own. Justice Scalia argued that the agreement between the
plaintiff ruid the government on the proper interpretation of DOMA eliminated any case or controversy and deprived the Court of jurisdiction to
hear the appeaL He also stated that there were several good reasons for
DOMA's definition of marriage, including the avoidance of difficult
choice-of-law issues that are likely to arise in the absence of a unifonn
federal definition. Justice Alito dissented, stating that the United States
l(lcked standing to appeal from the holding of the District Court and the
Second Circuit, because it sought to sustain those holdings, rather than to
change them. He argued that BLAG was the proper appellant in this case.
Justice Alito also contended that the Fifth Amendment· cannot defeat
DOMA under the notion of substantive due process, because that rule protects only "fundamental rights and liberties which are, objectively, 'deeply
rooted in this Nation's history and tradition.'" He denied that the right to
same-sex marriage can fall within that category at this time.
Note. Windsor means that same-sex manied couples residing in a
state that recognizes such maniages as valid will clearly be treated as married for both state and federal purposes. Recognition of their marriage for
state law purposes will afford the surviving spouse such benefits as elective share or augmented estate rights in the first spouse's estate, status as
an heir at law in the estate of an intestate decedent, whatever priority may
exist for surviving spouses in the selection of an administrator of a dece-
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dent's estate, and whatever marital deduction or favorable rate may be allowed smviving spouses under applicable state estate or inheritance tax
laws. Such surviving spouses will now also qualify for the federal estate
and gift tax marital deductions and portability of a deceased spouse's unused basic exclusion amount.

2.

Failure to Divide Marital from Nonmarital Trust Results in Substantial Distributions Being Deemed Made From Noninarital Trust and
Increases Surviving Spouse's Gross Estate. Estate of Olsen v. Comni '1·,
T.C. Memo. 2014-58 (April2, 2014)
Elwood and Grace Olsen created reciprocal revocable trusts· as part of
their estate plan. Elwood was named trustee of both trusts. Grace died
first, and her instmments required that her assets be divided into a nonmarital tru$t and two marital trusts. Elwood, however, failed to divide the
trust. The tenus of the nonmarital trust provided for distributions of income and principal to the couple's children and grandchildren, and distributions to charitable organizations. Principal and income of the nomnarital trust could be used for the Elwood, if the marital trust principal had
been exhausted. After Grace's death, Elwood donated from Grace's trust a
total of $1.08 million to Momingside College, where he and Grace had
gone to school and where he had been employed. Elwood also withdrew
$393,978 from Grace's trust and deposited it into one of his own accounts.·
In examining Elwood's estate, the IRS contended that all of these transfers
should be charged against the nonmm·ital trust, and that the remaining assets should all be deemed part of the marital trust and includible in Elwood's gross estate under Section 2044.
The Tax Court (Judge Chiechi) held that $607,928 (the value that
was to have been transferred to the marital trusts, less the withdrawals that
Elwood deposited into his oyvn account)must be included in Elwood's
gross estate as assets of the marital tmsts. The court noted that the marital
trusts did not permit distributions to charity, so that it must conclude that
the was made from the nonmarital trust, which allowed such distributions.
The estate argued that the withdrawals should be treated as having come
from the marital trusts because the instrument expressed the grantor's intent to minimize estate taxes for the benefit of the remainder beneficiaries.
Had the withdrawals come from the marital trusts, they would have been
effectively eliminated by the surviving spouse's death, reducing total estate taxes. The court, however, found equally persuasive the couple's long
history of philanthropy and the express authority in the nonmarital trust to
make charitable distributions.
Note. It is unusual for a nonmarital trust to authorize charitable
distributions, because they would constitute deductible distributions made
from a nontaxable fund. It would be much better tax planning for the marital tmst to authorize and then make distributions of principal to the surviving spouse, and then for the surviving spouse make the charitable gifts
personally.. This produces· additional charitable income tax deductions for
15

the surviving spouse, and takes full advantage of the gift tax charitable deduction, too:

3.

Sale of Assets Distributed from QTIP for Defened Private Annuity
Results in Taxation Under Section 2519. Estate of Kite v. Comm'r, T.C.
No. 6772-08,2013 TNT 208-18 (Ul)pub'd Op., Oct. 25, 2013)
Virginia Kite (the decedent) was the cun·ent income beneficiary of numerous trusts, including two QTIPs, a general power of appointment marital
trust, and a revocable trust. QTIP-1 had been created by the decedent for
the lifetime benefit of her husband, James, who died a week later, creating
a QTIP trust for the decedent. QTIP-2 vvas a reverse QTIP trust created at
James' death. The power of appointment marital trust was created at
James' death. In 1996, the trusts created a limited partnership, a majority
of the shares of the corporate general partner (Easterly) of which were
owned by Virginia, through her revocable trust, and the balance by her
children, directly and through various trusts. · In 1998, the limited partnership was moved to Texas and became the Baldwin Limited Partnership.
In May 1998, Virginia, through her trusts, sold her remaining interest in
the partnership to her children, either individually or to their trusts, for
$12.5 milliqn in of secured, fully recourse promissory notes (the Baldwin
notes). On December 31, 2000, Virginia's trusts contributed the Baldwin
notes and Easterly contributed 1 percent of its value to form Kite Family
Investment Co. (KIC), a Texas general partnership. In 2001 the QTIP
trusts and the marital deduction trust were liquidated, and the trusts' assets, which consisted entirely of family partnership interests, were transferr-ed to Virginia's revocable trust. The family partnership interests held
by the revocable trust were then transferred to the decedent's children in
exchange for 10-year deferred private annuity agreements.
The Tax. Court (Judge Paris) held that, under the step-transaction
doctrine, Virginia was deemed to have made a taxable disposition of the
qualifying income interest. Therefore, the sale was taxable as a gift of the
remainder interest in the property sold for a private annuity. The court
recognize~ that the proportionate share of the annuity value that was
traceable to the QTIP trusts was not readily apparent, and it asked the parties to calculate the amount of the gift. The parties submitted their proposed valuations, and not surprisingly, they disagreed rather strongly on
the amount of the deemed taxable gift. The Tax Court, in an unpublished
opinion, sustained the IRS calculation of the amount of the taxable gift.
The court noted that Section2519(a) states that any disposition of all or
part of a qualifying income interest for life is treated as a transfer of all in~
terests in the property other than the qualifying income interest, and the
regulations add that the spouse is treated as making a gift of the remainder
interest under Section 2519 and of the income interest under Section 2511.
Regs. § 25.2519~1(a). The amount of the remainder interest gift is "the fair
market value of the entire property subject to the qualifying income interest, determined on the date of the disposition * * *, less the value of the
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qualifying income interest in the prope1ty on the date of the disposition."
The parties agreed that the fair mai:ket value of the QTIP trust assets was
$2,665,106 and on the disposition date the value of the annuity traceable
to remainder interest in the QTIP trusts was$1,484,011. The taxpayer,
however, argued that no gift tax was due, because the court had held that
the annuity transaction was a bona fide sale for adequate and full consideration. Therefore, the taxpayer argued, Mrs .. Kite had transfened an income interest worth $1,181,095 for an annuity worth $1,181,095, and she
had transferred a remainder interest worth $1;484,011 for an mmuity worth
$1,484,011. The court explained, however, that this is not how Section
2519 operates. The court agreed with the IRS that the Kite annuity transaction was an intermediary step between tenninating the QTIP trusts and
selling the QTIP trust assets to the Kite children, in an attempt to circumvent the QTIP regime and avoid any deemed transfer under Section 2519.
A deemed transfer of a remainder interest under section 2519 cannot be
reduced merely because consideration is received for the transfer of the
income interest. The donee spouse cannot receive consideration in exchange for a remainder interest that the done could not actually transfer.
The court also stated that this result was supported by the intent of the
marital deduction and the QTIP regime, that property passes untaxed from
a predeceasing spouse to a surviving spouse but'is then included in the es~
tate of the surviving spouse. Estate of Letts v. Comm.'r, 109 T.C. 290, 295
(1997), affd without pub 'd op., 212 F.3d 600 (11th Cir. 2000). The QTIP
provisions allow QTIP to pass to a surviving spouse tax free at the first
spouse's death, but they require thaf the QTIP be subject to transfer taxes
at the earlier of (1) the date on which the surviving spouse disposes (by
gift, sale, or otherwise) of all or part of the qualifying income interest, or
(2) upon the surviving spouse's death. See H.R. Rept. No. 97-201, 97th
Cong., 2d Sess. at·161 (1981
Note. The application of Section 2519 should not be that much of
a concern to practitioners. First, the previously-QTIP assets were sold for
a defened annuity, with no payments to be made for the flrst 10 years.
There was, therefore, no income inferest after the sale.
Second, Virginia removed the corporate trustee and put her children in as trustees of the QTIP; it was unclear whether the children even
had authority under the instrument to terminate the QTIP trust a11d distribute all of its assets to the decedent, as they did.
Third, the step-transaction argument was pretty easy to sustain, because the children terminated the QTIP and distributed its assets to Virginia on the smne day fhat they were substituted as trustees. The next day,
the family consolidated assets of several partnerships in one extant fmnily
partnership. The day after that, Virginia sold her pmtnership interests for
the defened private annuity.
Fomth, the court approved the fact that the QTIP created a fmnily
partnership and conve1ted its assets to partnership interests. The court
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stated that this was just a change in the form of the investments, and did
not impair Virginia's qualifying income interests for life.
So, what does this tell. us. Probably just that if, in a clearly integrated transaction, you withdraw principal from a QTIP and transfer the
underlying assets without retaining an income interest, you risk ta'Cation
under Section 2519. I am not sure how much of a surprise that ought to
be.
See also discussion of gift tax consequences of the private annuity
sales under Section 2511.

4.

IRS Applies a Law-of-the-Ceremony Rule to Same-Sex Marriages.
Rev. Rul. 2013-17, 2013-38 I.R.B. 201 (Sept. 16, 2013)
The IRS responded to the Supreme Court's.opinion in Windsor, ruling that
same-sex couples who are legally married in states or foreign countries
that recognize the validity of their man·iages will be treated as married for
all federal ·tax purposes, even if they live in a state or other Jurisdiction
that does not recognize same-sex maniages. The IRS noted that it had
long interpreted such as "husband," "wife," ''spouse," and "married" for
income tax purposes in this maimer. In Rev. Rul. 58-66, 1958-1 C.B. 60,
the IRS had stated that individuals who entered into a common-law marriage in a state that recognizes common-law marriages should be recognized as married for federal income tax purposes, regardless of the law of
the jurisdiction in which the individuals are currently domiciled. The IRS
explained that:
The Service has applied this rule with respect to common- ·
law marriages for over 50 years, despite the refusal of some
states to give full faith and credit to common-law marriages
established in other states. Although states have different
rules of marriage recognition, uniform nationwide rules are
essential for efficient and fair tax administration. A nlle
. under which a couple's marital status could change simply
by moving fi·om one state to another state would be prohibitively difficult and costly for the Service to administer,
and for many taxpayers to apply.
This ruling is relatively old, but it has been cited by the IRS as recently as
this year. See, e.g., PLRs 201310047 ("In the administration of federal income tax laws, the marital status of individuals is determined under state
law pursuant to Rev. Rul. 58-66"), 200524006, 200524007, 200339001,
9850011.
The IRS explained further that, after Windsor, gender-neutral te1ms
in the Code that refer to marital status, such as "spouse" and "marriage,"
inust include both individuals married to a person of the same sex if the
couple is lawfully married under state law, and such a maniage between
individuals of the same sex. The IRS explained that this reading was the
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most natural, that is was consistent with Windsor, which involved a Code
reference to·"spouse," that "a narrower interpretation would not further the
pmposes of y:fficient tax administration," and that tlris interpretation
"avoids the serious constitutional questions that an altemate reading would
create, and is permitted by the text and purposes of the Code." The IRS
stated that Windsor recognized tl1at it had an effect beyond the yState tax
marital deduction, noting that the Court had stated that:
[t]he pruticular case at hand concerns the estate tax, but
DOMA is more than simply a determination of what should
or should not be allowed as an estate ta.'{ refund. Among the
over 1,000 statutes and numerous Federal regulations that
DOMA controls are laws peliaining to ... taxes.
Windsor, 133 S.Ct. 2675, at 2694 (S.Ct., 2013). The IRS also stated that
an interpretation of the gender-specific tenns in the Code to exclude samesex spouses should be avoided because it would raise "serious constitutional questions under the Fifth Amendment analysis in Windsor "[b]y
creating two contradictory marriage regimes within the same State, DOMA forces same-sex couples to live as mamed for the purpose of state law
but unmarried for the purpose of Federal law, thus diminishing the stability and predictability of basic personal relations the State has found it
proper to acknowledge and protect." Windsor, 133 S.Ct. 2675, at 2694
(S.Ct., 2013). The IRS also stated that the Code permits a gender-neutral
·construction of the gender-specific terms, noting that, among other things
Section 770l(p), by its cross-reference to the Dictionary Act, provides that
"words importing the masculine gender include the feminine as well," and
that the 1871 legislative history of this statute explained that it was designed to avoid having to "specify males and females by using a great deal
of mmecessary lru1guage when one word would express the whole." 1
U.S.C. § 1; Cong. Globe, 41st Cong., 3d Sess. 777 (1871) (statement of
Sen. Trumbull, sponsor of Dictionary Act). One court has, the IRS noted,
read this as requiring construction of the phrase "husband and wife" to include same-sex married couples. See Pedersen v. Office of Personnel
Mgmt., 881 F. Supp. 2d 294, 306-07 (D. Conn. 2012). The IRS also explained that a "gender-neutral reading of the Code fosters fairness by ensuring that the Service treats same-sex couples in the same manner as sitnilarly situated opposite-sex couples" and also "fosters administrative efficiency because the Service does not collect or maintain information on the
gender of ~axpayers and would have great difficulty admitristering a
scheme that differentiated between same-sex and opposite-sex married
couples."
The IRS stated that, therefore, the tern1s "husband and wife," "husband,'' and "wife" include an individual mruried to a person of the same
sex if they were lawfully mruried in a state whose laws authorize the marriage of two individuals of the same sex, and the tenn "mru-riage" includes
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such marriages of individuals of the same sex. Individuals of the same sex
will be considered to be lawfully married for federal tax purposes as long
as they were married in a state whose laws authorize the marriage of two
individuals of the same sex, even if they are domiciled in a state that does
not recognize the validity of same-sex marriages. The IRS explained that
"our increasingly mobile society" makes it important to have rule that can
be applied with certainty, and that a state-of-domicile rule "would present
serious administrative concerns" and would raise challenges for employers
who operate in multiple states or who have employees or fanner employees residing in different states.
A rule of recognition based on the state of a taxpayer's current
domicile would also raise significant challenges for employers that operate
in more than one state, or that have employees (or fom1er employees) who
live in more than one state, or move between states with different marriage
recognition rules. Substantial financial and administrative burdens would
be placed on those employers, as well as the administrators of employee
benefit plans.
The IRS added, however, that for Federal tax purposes, the term
11
marriage 11 does not include registered domestic partnerships, civil unions,
or other similar formal relationships recognized under state law that are
not denominated as a marriage under that state's law. The use in federal
tax law of such terms as "spouse," "husband and wife," 11 husband," and
"wife" will not include individuals who have entered itito such a formal relationship, whether the individuals have entered into such relationships are
of the opposite sex or the same sex.
The IRS stated that this ruling will be applied prospectively as of
September 16,2013. For tax year 2013 and going forward, taxpayers generally must ftle returns reflecting marital status as detemrined under Rev.
Rul. 2013-17. Therefore, married same-sex couples would file income tax
returns either as married filing separately or jointly filing status, and they
would be able to file gift tax returns gift-splitting and claiming the gift tax
marital deduction. For tax year 2012 and all prior years, same-sex spouses
who file an original tax return on or after September 16, 2013 also must
generally file using a married filing separately or jointly filing status.
Same-sex spouses who filed their 2012 income or gift tax returns before
September 16, 2013, may, if they wish, amend their returns to file reflecting their marital status as dete1mined under Rev. Rul. 2013-17. For tax
years 2011 and earlier, same-sex spouses who filed their tax returns on
tinle may, but are not required to, amend their federal tax returns to file reflecting marital status determined under Rev. Rul. 2013-17, if the statute
of limitations for amending the retum has not expired.
Note. Same-sex married couples will now be treated as married for
federal income, gift, estate, and GST tax purposes. Same-sex spouses will
now be afforded such advantages as gift splitting, the federal estate and
gift tax marital deductions, the ability to make a reverse QTIP election for
GST tax purposes, the ability to treat a spouse who is significantly young-
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er than the transferor as being ·assigned to the same generation for GST tax
purposes, and the ability of the surviving spouse to obtain portability of a
deceased spouse's unused basic exclusion amount. San\e-sex spouses will
also, however, lose the ability to file two independent income tax returns,
and will have to file federal income tax retums either as manied filing
jointly or married filing separately.
Rev. Rul. 2013-17 may also affect the state tax treatment of some
same-sex couples. Windwr did not require that states recognize tlw validity of same-sex marriages, and many states, such as Virginia and Ohio,
have statutes and Constitutional provisions that expressly reject the validity of same-sex marriages. Some of these states also require that the same·
filing status be used for federal and state income tax retmns. See, however, Va. Code § 58.1-341 (requiring a husband and wife who file a joint
federal retum to file a joint Virginia retum, and requiring a husband and
wife who file separate federal returns to file separate Virginia retums). It
is unclear how a state department of taxation will resolve the conflict between such anti-same-sex malTiage provisions and state laws that require
taxpayers to use the same filing status for federal and state tax rettm1s. In
states in which the state constitutio~1 prohibits recognition of same-sex
maniages, it seems likely that the statutes requiring confonnity in filing
status would be subordinated to the state constitutional provisions. In
states in which both issues are addressed only statutorily, the results are
unceliain and m1predictable.
There is also a question about the constitutional considerations
where a same-sex couples who is married in state A that permits such marriages then becomes domiciled in state B, that does not recognize such sex
marriages. Aliicle IV, section 1 of the U.S. Constitution states, in part,
that "Full Faith and Credit shall be given in each State to the public Acts,
Records, and judicial Proceedings of every other State." A marriage entered into in one state would fall under the "public Acts" provision of the
full faith and credit clause. Generally, the coulis have held that full faith
and credit afforded public acts differs from that afforded judgments. Public acts of one state may be disregarded by a forum state if they violate a
strong public policy of the forum state. See Baker by Thomas v. General
Motors Corp., 522 U.S. 222 (1998); Gaillard v. Field, 381 F.2d 25 (lOth
Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 1044 (1968); Roy v. Star Chopper Co.,
Inc., 442 F.Supp. 1010 (D.R.I. 1977), affd, 584 F.2d 1124 (1st Cir.,
1978), cert. denied 440 U.S. 916 (1979). Generally, the Full Faith and
Credit clause does not appear to require one state to give effect to samesex marriages performed in another state. A forum state may choose to do
so, but it is not required to do so, paliicularly if doing so would violate a
strong public policy of the forum state.
It is interesting that Windsor struck down only section 3 of DO~
MA. Section 2 of DOMA, which was not discussed by the Couli, provides that:
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No State, tenitory, or possession of the United States, or
Indian tribe, shall be required to .give effect to any public
act, record, or judicial proceeding of any other State, territory, possession, or tribe respecting a relationship between
persons of the same sex that is treated as a marriage under
the laws of such other State, territory, possession, or tribe,
qr a right or claim arising from such relationship. 28
U.S.C. § 1738C.
This statement appears to be authorized by the second sentence of Article
IV, section 1 of the U.S. Constitution, which states "And the Congress
may by general Laws prescribe the Manner in which such Acts, Records,
and Proceedings shall be proved, and the Effect thereof." It is unclear
whether Section 2 ofDOMA adds anything of significance. Each state al. ready appears to have the authority under the Full Faith and Credit Clause
to ignore public acts of another state, ifthey violate a strong public policy
of the forum state. Furthennore, Section 2 of DOMA does not require that
· states refuse to recognize same~sex marriages obtained in another state- it
merely authorizes them to do so. Thus, the retention of Section 2 of DO- ·
MA appears to have little consequence.
In Tax Bull. 13~13 (Nov. 8, 2013), the Va. Dept. of Tax'n stated
that, because same~sex married couples are not married under Virginia
law, and despite Rev. Rul. 2013-17, must file as unmarried persons for
Virginia income tax purposes, even if they file as married persons for feel~
eral purposes. They must create a pro forma federal income tax return using either single or head-of-household status, as the case may be, in order
to determine their Virginia taxable income. See also similar declaration
from the Utah Tax Commission (Oct. 15, 2013), http://incometax.
utah.gov/:filing/filing-status, which also noted that the taxpayers should not
file the "as-if" federal return either with the federal govermnent or the
Utah Tax Commission, but rather keep it as part of their tax records, in
· case of an audit.

5.

Marital Deduction Not Allowed for Portion of Elective Share That
Cannot ·Actually Be Transferred to Surviving Spouse. C.C.M.
201416007 (April18, 2014)
D, a U.S. person, made a gift to an irrevocable trust in Country A for the
benefit ofD and D's adult child, Child. The trust is not subject to the jurisdiction of the U.S. courts. D died, survived by Spouse, who asse1ted
her right tinder applicable state law to an elective share of D's estate.
Under state law, Spouse· was entitled to a fractional share of D's augmented estate, which included the gifts made to the trust for D and Child. The
augmented estate would be satisfied first by D's probate assets and the assets of D's revocable trust, and if that is inadequate, with the gifts made by
D that are inciudible in the augmented estate. The probate and revocable
trust assets were insufficient, and Spouse became entitled to part of the
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gift made by D to the trust: D's executors deducted the elective share as
marital deduction property on D's estate tax return.
The IRS Chief Counsel stated that, to the extent that the elective
share was satisfied with property given to a trust for D and Child, it could
not qualify for the estate tax marital deduction, because it did not pass
from D to Spouse. The IRS noted that, under the law of Country A, state
laws governing spousal inheritance have no effect on the continuation of
the trqst and the comts of Country A will not recognize the rights of
Spouse against the assets. of the trust. State law detennines the property
rights passing to Spouse in the prope1iy, though federal estate tax law determines the taxation of those property rights. Comm 'r v. Bosch, 387 U.S.
456 (1967); Heim v. Comm'r,_ 914 F.2d 1322 (9th Cir. 1990). In this case,
the pecuniary amount of the elective share passing to Spouse was determined under state law by taldng into account the value of the trust assets,
but those assets are not actually available to satisfy that elective share, be.cause they are held subject to the laws of Country A and those laws will
not permit distribution of the trust assets to Spouse. Normally, an elective
share is treated as passing from the decedent to the surviving spouse for
marital deduction purposes.
See Code § 2056(c)(3) and Reg. § .
20.2056(c)-1(a)(3). Any property interest transferred during life is con, sidered as having passed to the person to whom the decedent transferred
the interest, however. Reg. § 20.2056(c)-1(a)(5). Propetiy that passes
from a decedent in trust is considered to have passed from the decedent to
the surviving spouse only to the extent of the surviving spouse's beneficial
interest in the. trust. Citing Estate of Turner v. Comm 'r, 138 T.C. 306
(2012) ("[a] propetiy interest is considered as passing to the smviving
spouse only if it passes to the spouse as beneficial owner" (emphasis added)). In the facts in this ruling, because Spouse received none of the beneficial ownership of the trust assets, they are not deemed to have passed to
Spouse for purposes of the marital deduction, and they are not deductible.
Note. Practitioners are sometimes asked how to avoid the rights of
a surviving spouse under an augmented estate statute modeled after the
Uniform Probate Code. This has always been a difficult issue to resolve,
but this memorandum suggests that creating a foreign situs asset protection trust to· hold a substantial portion of a client's assets may succeed in
frustrating the elective share rights of a surviving spouse. It is a pretty
dramatic step to take, but at least the practitioner now has one suggestion
that he or she can make.

6.

Transfers Under premarital Agreement Qualify for Marital Deduction. PLR 20140011 (March 7, 2014)
Taxpayer and Spouse executed premarital agreement under which each
waived their respective right of election to take against the other's will.
The agreement provides that upon Taxpayer's death, if Spouse survives
him and if they are then married and living together, Spouse will receive
an outright payment of $w, free and net of any and all estate, transfer and
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income taxes, or, if Taxpayer and Spouse were married and living together
for at least 10 years when he dies, Spouse will receive a QTIP marital bust
with at least ~ percent of Taxpayer's taxable estate, before deducting
amounts due for Federal estate tax purposes under the premarital agreement. Taxpayer established a revocable trust to carry out the provisions of
the premarital agreement, providing that if Spouse makes a timely election
to waive elective share, the trustee will allocate and make distributions to
Spouse as provided in the premarital agreement. The trust provides that
the trustee can satisfy the payments under the premarital agreement with
preferred non-voting units of LLC. Taxpayer, as u·ustee of the revocable
trust, holds voting and non-voting common. units of LLC and all of the
preferred units.
The IRS stated that Spouse's right to elect under the premarital
agreement and the revocable trust is not a "contingency" that would disqualify the transfers .for the estate tax marital deduction, under Section
2056(b)(1). The revocable trust property actually distributed outright to
Spouse and to marital trust will be property "passing from the decedent to
his surviving spouse" for marital deduction purposes. The IRS discussed
several precedents. In Rev. RuL 54-446, 1954-2 C.B. 303, a couple signed
a premarital agreement under which each spouse renounced rights in the
other's estate. The husband died, and his will left the wife more than was
required by the premarital agreement, and specified that the dispositions
were in lieu of any rights she might have under the premarital agreement.
The IRS ruled that the amount left to the wife under the will "passed from
the decedent to his smviving spouse" and qualified for the estate tax marital deduction. In Rev. Rul. 6~-271, 1968-1 C.B. 409, a wife renounced her
marital rights by signing a premarital agreement, in retum for a promise of
a stated SUlll from husband's estate, if she survived him. The husband
died and his will made no provision for the wife. The wife put in a claim
against the husband's estate and the estate paid the required sum to the
wife. The ruling stated that the interest passing to the wife pursuant to the
premarital agreement "passed from the decedent to his smviving spouse"
and qualified for the estate .tax marital deduction. In Estate of Tompkins v.
Comm 'r, 68 T.C. 912 (1977), acq., 1982-1 C.B. 1, a decedent gave his
widow a life estate in trust, and by codicil provided that she could elect to
take an outright cash bequest in lieu of the life estate. To elect the cash
bequest, the. widow had to file an election with the executor within 60 days
after his qualification. The widow elected the cash bequest and the court
held that the procedural requirement did not prevent the disposition from
qualifying for the estate tax marital deduction, and that the cash bequest
was a nontenninable interest. In Rev. Rul. 82-184, 1982-2 C.B. 215, the
IRS considered a situation similar to that in Tompkins and reached the
same conclusion. In the mling, the IRS stated that the 180-day requirement for Spouse to claim the interests promised by the premarital agreement did not interfere with the estate ta.~ marital deduction, and that the
QTIP interest would be deductible. The IRS also noted that the terms of
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the QTIP trust directed the trustee to distribute all net income at least quarter-annually, and that the fact the bequest was satisfied by LLC preferred
units did not prevent allowance of the marital deduction. The IRS noted
that the sale of LLC prefetTed units was not unreasonably restricted by the
LLC agreement, which allowed a member to transfer units to (a) another
member, (b) a qualified institutional transferee, (c) the husband, his children, and/or any affiliate, without obtaining the prior written consent of a
majority in interest of the members.

7.

The "Huh?" Award for 2013: IRS Agrees to Ignore QTIP Election
Made on Credit Shelter Trust That Could Not Be a QTIP Anyway.
PLR 201338003 (Sept. 20, 2013)
Decedent's will left all of his tangible property outright to Spouse and left
the residue of his estate to his 'revocable trust. The revocable tmst provided for division of the fund into Trust 1 (a marital trust) and Trust 2 (a
credit shelter nonmarital trust).
The amount to ftmd Trust 2 is that
amount that vvill pass free of federal and state death taxes. The trustee of
Trust 2 has discretion to pay so much of the n,et income and principal as is
necessary for the health, education, support and maintenance of Spouse
and Decedent's children. Undistributed income will be accumulated and
added to principal. Upon Spouse's death, Tmst 2 will continue for the
benefit of Son, until Son reaches age 35, when the trust corpus will be distributed to Son. Spouse, the executrix of Decedent's estate, allocated all
of the assets of Trust to Trust 2 and did not establish Trust 1. Spouse filed
a timely estate tax retum and listed Trust 2 under QTIP property. With the
·assistance of new counsel, Spouse discovered that the QTIP election for
Trust 2 was not necessary to reduce Decedent's estate tax liability to zero.
The IRS stated that it would ignore the QTIP election made with
respect to Trust 2. The IRS cited Rev. Proc. 2001-38, 2001-1 C.B. 1335,
in which the Service stated that it would treat a QTIP election as null and
void for purposes of Sections 2044(a), 2056(b)(7), 2519(a), and 2652,
where the election was not necessary to reduce the estate tax liability to
zero, based on values as finally detennined for federal estate tax purposes. ·
The IRS stated that it would ignore the QTIP election in this case because
it was not required to reduce the decedent's estate tax to zero, and that
Spouse would not be deemed to by the transferor of Trust 2 for GST tax
purposes, absent a "reverse QTIP" election under Section 2652(a)(3).
Furthermore, the property held in Trust 2 will not be includible in
Spouse's gross estate under Section 2044, and Spouse will not be treated
as making a. gift under Section 2519 if Spouse disposes of the income interest with respect to the property.
Note. It is hard to fathom why the IRS gave this mling, because
Trust 2 fails to meet any of the requirements of a valid QTIP. It does not
require that all income be paid cutTently to Spouse, and it permits distributions to persons other than Spouse during Spouse's lifetime. The IRS
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should simply have ruled that there was no valid QTIP election as to Trust
2 in the first place.
III.

GIFT
A.

T~"XES

Code § 2503. Gift Tax Annual Exclusion
Annual Exclusion Adjusted for Inflation. Rev. Proc. 2013-35, § 3.34, 2013-47
I.R.B. 537 (Nov. 18, 2013)

The gift tax annual exclusion rises to $14,000 for transfers made in 2014. The
annual exclusion for gifts to a non-U.S. citizen spouse is raised to $145,000 for
gifts made in2014.
·
B.

Code § 2512. Val{!ation of Gifts
1.

Tax Court Denies Summary Judgment toiRS on Net, Net Gift. Steinberg v. Comm'r, 141 T.C. _(No.8) (Sept. 30, 2013)

When she was 89, Jean Steinberg entered into a binding agreement with
her four daughters under which Jean would make gifts of cash and securities to her daughters in exchange for the daughtersr agreement to assume
and pay any federal gift tax liability collllected with the gifts, including
any federal' or state estate tax liability imposed under Section 203 5(b) if
Jean died within three years of the gifts. (Section 2035(b) includes in a
decedenfs gross estate the gift taxes paid on any gift made by the decedent
within three years of death.) The net gift agreement was the result of several months of negotiation between Jean and her daughters, and they each
were represented by separate cOlmsel. An independent professional appraiser calculated the aggregate fair market value of the net gift, taking into account the agreement to pay the gift and potential estate taxes. The
appraiser valued the net gift by reducing the fair market value of the cash
and securities by both (1) the gift tax paid by the donees, and (2) the actuarial value of the donees' assumption of potential Section 203 5(b) estate
tax. The appraiser determined the actuarial value of the donees' assumption of the potential Section 2035(b) estate tax by calculating Jean's annual mortality rate for the three years after the gift (the probability that she
would die within one~ two, or three years of the gift), among other things.
The appraiser stated that the value of the net gift was $71.6 million, reflecting, among other things, a $5.8 million value for the assumed Section
2035(b) estate tax liability. Jean filed a timely gift tax return and paid $32
million of gift tax.
The IRS issued a notice of deficiency, increasing the value of the
net gift to $75.6 million and the amount of the tax to $33.8 million, because it disallowed the valuation adjustment for the assumption of the Section 2035(b) estate tax liability. The IRS conceded that Jean had accurately stated the value of the cash and securities given, that the net gift agree-
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ment was legally enforceable, and that Jean had properly reduced the
amount of the gift by the gift· taxes that the donees assumed. The IRS
moved for stmunary judgment in Tax Court, however, arguing that the assumption of potential Section 2035(b) estate tax liability could never constitute consideration in money or money's worth under Section 2512(b),
and thus could not reduce the amount of Jean's taxable gift. The IRS relied largely on the Tax Com·t's earlier decision in McCord v. Comm 'r, 120
T.C. 358 (2003), rev'd and rem 'd sub nom. Succession of McCord v.
Comm'r, 461 F.3d 614 (5th Cir. 2006).
The Tax Comi (Judge Kenigan for the majority), rejected the
summary judgment and stated that, while tllis case was not appealable to
the Fifth Circuit and it was by Succession of McCord, the Fifth Circuit's
reasoning was persuasive and the Tax Court would no longer follow its
own 2003 opinion in McCord. The majority, adopting the Fifth Circuit's
reasoning, stated that the value of the assun1ption of the estate tax liability was not "too speculative," and that a willing buyer and a willing seller would, in appropriate circtm1stances, take into account the assumption
of potential estate tax liability in arriving at a sale price. See Regs. §
25.2512-1 (the value of a gift is the price at which the transferred property would change hands between a willing buyer and a willing seller,
neither being under any compulsion to buy or to sell and .both having
reasonable knowledge of relevant facts). The comi stated that, whether
Jean would Sut'Vive three years after making the gift was a simple contingency based on the possibility of survivorship. The court rejected the
IRS's assessment that the assumption of potential estate tax liability
failed under the estate depletion theory. To qualify as consideration in
money or money's worth, the consideration received mi1st be reducible
to value in money or money's worth; consideration consisting of something unquantifiable, such as love and affection or the promise of marriage, is wholly disregarded. Regs. § 25.2512-8. Under the estate depletion theory, a donor receives consideration in money or money's worth
only to the extent that the donor's estate has been replenished. The IRS
argued that the donees' assumption of potential Section 2035(b) estate
tax liability would not benefit the estate, but the comi stated that it could
provide a tangible benefit to the donor's estate. The maj01ity stated that
the Tax Court's earlier distinction between a benefit to the donor's estate
and a benefit to the donor was incorrect, and that for purposes of the estate depletion theory, the donor and the donor's estate were "inextricably
bound" and the donees' assumption of potential estate tax liability could
provide a tangible benefit to tl1e donor's estate. Judges Colvin, Foley,
Vasquez, Wherry, Holmes, Paris, and Buch joined in the majority opin-

lOn.
Judges Gale, Goeke, Kroupa, Gustafson, MolTison and Lauber
conculTed in the result only. Judge Lauber wrote a concurring opinion,
agreeing with the court's conclusion that the IRS's motion should be de~
nied~ but disagreed that it was appropriate for the comi to overrule
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McCord at this stage of the litigation. Judge Lauber stated that a "foreseeable valuation issue . . . :may result from the strategy in this case at the
time of a donor's death." The valuation of the obligation would, he contended, require consideration of the facts and circumstances of each case,
including: (1) whether Jean's daughters, at the time of the gifts, were beneficiaries under her will; (2) whether Jean's daughters, if not then beneficiaries under her will, should be regarded as such because they were the
natural objects of her affection and bounty; (3) whether Jean, a New York
resident when she made the gifts, should be deemed aNew York domiciliary for purposes of applying the New York apportionment statute; (4)
whether the net gift agreement provides an effective enforcement mechanism that does not exist under applicable New York law; (5) whether the
bulk of Jean's assets will be subject to probate or will pass by trust or other nonprobate mechanism, which might affect ease of enforcement; and
(6) whether any incremental enforcement benefit is substantial enough to
constitute "consideration" under Section 2512(b). Judges Gale, Goeke,
Kroupa, Gustafson, and Monison agreed with this opinion.
Judge Goeke added that it was not logical to presume that the value
of an obligation to pay poten~ial Section 2035(b) liability is the same when
the obligation is made as at the time of the donee's death. Judge Goeke
stated that the effect of the donor's estate tax apportionment clause would
be relevant to determining the value of the donees' obligation.
Judge Halpem wrote a dissenting opinion, stating that he would
grant the IRS's motion because allowing a reduction of an otherwise taxable transfer by an actuarial estimate of the value of the estate tax that
might result because of the application of Section 2035(b) was inconsistent with the purpose of Section 203 5(b).
Note. The Steinberg litigation will continue, but this opinion is a
very hopeful sign that net gifts will be more useful where the donees enter
into a binding agreement to be responsible for both the gift tax and any estate tax attributable to inclusion of the gift tax in the donor's gross estate
under Section 2035(b). Such an additional assumption may, as demonstrated in this decision, meaningfully reduce the value of the transfer for
gift tax purposes, even if the donor ultimately survives for more than three
years.

2.

Self-Cancelling Installment Note Not Valued Under Section 7520;
Premium Based on Seller's Actual Health. CCA 201330033 (July 26,
2013)
D .established several separate grantor for the benefit of his family
members. D funded the tmsts With common voting and prefened nonvoting stock of Y corporation. Thereafter, D sold Y corporation stock
to the tmsts in exchange for interest-bearing self-canceling installment
notes. The notes required that the tmst make only annual interest payments during the term of the note and further required that the principal
be paid on the final date of the term. The appraised value of the stock
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that D transfened to the. trusts was $x, and the total face value of the
self-cancelling notes was almost double the value of the stock sold, reflecting the premium for self-cancelation. The premium was calculated
using the actuarial tables under Section 7520. In some notes, the principal was increased to reflect the SCIN premium, and in other notes, the
interest rate was increased. D died less than six months after the transfer, and therefore, received neither the interest payments nor the princi~
pal due on the notes.
The Chief Counsel advised that: (1) if the fair market value of the
notes is less than the fair mm;ket value of the property transfen-ed to the
grantor trusts, the difference in value is a deemed gift; (2) the notes
should be valued based on a method that takes into account the willingbuyer willing seller standard and should also accotmt for D's medical
history on the date ofthe gift; and (3) there is no estate tax consequence
associated vyith the cancellation of the notes with the self-cancelling feature upon D's death. The IRS explained that, where propetiy is exchanged for promissory notes, there is no gift if the value of the property
transferred is substantially equal to the value of the notes. The face value
and length of payments of the riotes must be reasonable in light of the
.circumstances. To determine whether there is a gift, the IRS determines
the value of the transfen-ed stock and the value of the notes, taking into
consideration the self-cancelling feature. If the fair market value of the
notes is less than the fair market value of the property transfen-ed to the
grantor trusts, the ·difference in value is deemed a gift. The IRS discussed Estate of Costanza v.Comm'r, 320 F. 3d 595 (6th Cir. 2003), rev'g
T.C. Memo 2001-128, in the Sixth Circuit stated that, "a SCIN signed by
family members is presumed to be a gift and not a bona fide transaction."
Id. at 597. The court stated that the presumption may be rebutted by
showing that there existed at the time of the transaction a real expectation
of repayment and intent to enforce the collection of the indebtedness, and
. on the facts before it, the presumption had been rebutted. The taxpayer
rebutted the presumption in Estate of Costqnza, but in this case, the Chief
Counsel noted, the decedent did not need the stream of cash and used the
SCIN arrangement as "a device to transfer the stock to other family
members at· a substantially lower value than the fair mm·ket value of the
stock." The Chief Counsel also concluded that it was not clear that there
was a reasonable expectation that the debt would be repaid. The principal mnount on the notes exceeded the value of the assets sold to the trust,
though the IRS did recognize that the trusts had some assets from the initial gifts, and thus the estate could m·gue that the notes were bona fide
and that the trusts had sufficient assets to repay the loans.
The Chief Counsel also dete1mined that D could not value the
SCIN premium based strictly on the Section 7520 tables. The Chief
Counsel stated that the Section 7520 tables should not apply to value
SCIN notes, because Section 7520 .applies only to value "an annuity,
any interest for life or term of years, or any remainder." The Chief
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Counsel stated that the notes must be valued "based on a method that
takes into account the willing-buyer willing-seller standard" and that
"the decedent's life expectancy, taking into consideration decedent's
medical history on the date of the gift, should be taken into account."
Citing GCM 39503 (May 7, 1986). The IRS explained that, because of
D's health, it was unlikely that the full amount ofthe note would ever be
paid. Thus, the note was worth significantly less than its stated amount,
and the difference between the note's fair market value and its stated
an1ount constitutes a taxable gift.
Note. The IRS was correct that there is a taxable gift if the value
of the promissory notes is less than the value of the transfeiTed assets, and
that the SCIN should be effective to remove the underlying assets from the
seller's gross estate. It was incorrect, however, when it contended that the
lack of an independent nontax pmpose for the transaction means that the
SCIN should be disregarded, or that the Section 7520 tables are inapplicable to determine the SCIN premium.
With respect to the application of Section 7520, the IRS relies solely on GCM 39503, in which the IRS stated that:
The value of the installment obligation and the property
sold must be substantially equal. However, unlike the private annuity, there is no requirement that the actuarial tables are to be used in .determining the gift taxation of installment sale. Thus, the taxpayer's particular health status
may be considered, and there is more room to establish that
the terms of the sale are reasonable.
GCM 35903, however, predates Section 7520, which states that actuarial
tables must be used to value an "annuity, any interest for life or a term of
years, or any remainder or reversionary interest." Int. Rev. Code §
7520(a). Section 7520 states that it must be used to value "an interest for
life or a term of years," which precisely describes the payments under a
SCIN. Furthermore, the IRS publication "Actuarial Values, Alpha Volume," which implements the IRS actuarial tables under Section 7520, includes an example that uses the tables to determine "the present worth of a
temporary rumuity of $1.00 per annum payable annually for 10 years or
until the prior death of a person aged 65 ...." This, too, appears to describe precisely the calculation of the premium for a SCIN. Thus, Section
7520 appears to apply to the valuation of a SCIN premium. It may also be
noteworthy that in Dallas v. Comm 'r, T.C. Memo. 2006-212 the IRS appears to have determined the value of a SCIN using the actuarial tables
under Section 7520.
Practitioners should generally use the actuarial tables under Section 7520 to calculate the premium on a SCIN, but they should also be
aware of the possibility that the IRS may challenge this calculation to the
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extent that the seller's actual life expectancy is significantly different from
·
his or her ac_tuariallife expectancy.

C.

Code § 2518. Disclaimers
Disclaimer of Pre-1977 Interests is Timely if Made Within a Reasonable
Time Mter First Learning of the Existence of the Interest. PLR 201334001
(Aug. 23, 2013)
Grantor created four Trusts several years before his death before January 1; 1977.
The tmsts were to provide for the lawful lineal descendants of Daughter, per stirpes. Daughter's son, Grandson, is the cunent beneficiary of the fom trusts. Upon
Grandson's death, Grandson's son (Taxpayer) will be entitled to income distributions from Taxpayer's per stilpita1 share of Trusts. The income distributions will
continue until the earlier of Taxpayer's death or the perpetuities date. Upon termination of each of the Trusts, any remaining trust property will be distributed to
Ta'<payer and his brother, per stirpes. Taxpayer, who is over 18 years of age, represents that he learned of the transfers creating his interests in Trusts only on Date
2 and that, until then, he did not even know that he had any interest in Trusts.
Taxpayer proposed to disclaim his interests in Trusts on or before. Date 3, which
is not more than nine months after Date 2. The disclaimers would be valid under
applicable state law.
The IRS stated that the disclaimers would be timely, even though made far
after the date set by Section 2518 for a qualified disclaimer. Section 2518 requires that a disclaimer of a transfer made after December 31, 1976, must be
made within nine months of the date on which the transfer occurs, but disclaimers
of transfers made before January 1, 1977 need only be made witl1in a reasonable
time following the date the disclaimant first learns of the interest. See Jewett v.
Comm'r, 455 U.S. 305 (1982). The IRS concluded that nin~ months was a reasonable time after Taxpayer learned of the existence of the transfers, and that the
disclaimer would be respected for estate and gift tax purposes.

D~

Gift Tax Procedures
Assets of Irrevocable Trust May Be Foreclosed Upon to Satisfy Grantor's
Gift and Income Tax Deficiency, Because of Purchase-Money Resulting
Trust. United States v. Tingey, 716 F.3d 1295 (lOth Cir. May 29, 2013), aff'g
2011 WL 4889520, 108 A.F.T.R.2d 2011-6755 (D. Utah, 2011)
In 1993, Douglas Brown created the Brown Family Tmst, an inevocable trust for
himself, his wife, .and their four children. Douglas's brother-in-law, Robert
Tingey, was named trustee. Douglas and his wife, Barbara, negotiated to buy a
ski cabin. The seller conveyed undivided half interests in the cabin to two trusts
that he created (the Jensen Trusts), and each of those tmsts then conveyed its interest to Tingey, ·for the Family Trust. Douglas paid an earnest-money deposit,
and then gave a cashier's check for the $72,000 down payment, and executed a
$200,000 promissory note in favor of the Jensen Trusts. Douglas was the sole ob-
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ligor on the note, he executed a trust deed to the cabin as security, and he gave the
Jensen Trusts as additional security a security interest in a snow-plowing machine·
and a share of stock representing the water rights to the cabin. The lots were not
marketable without the water rights. Douglas and Barbara began used the cabin
without the trustee's permission, petformed maintenance work, and paid the utility bills and premiums on an insurance policy for the cabin issued in Douglas'
name. Douglas later leased the cabin to a friend and instructed him to pay rent directly to the Jensen Trusts to be applied against the payments due on the note.
The note payments were also satisfied from direct payments by Douglas and other
sources closely connected with Douglas.
·Douglas was fmmd to owe the IRS over $2 million in unpaid gift and income tax:es, and the IRS attempted to foreclose on the sld cabin. ·
The U.S. District Court for Utah (Judge Jenldns) permitted the IRS to
foreclose on federal tax liens on the ski cabin, despite the fact that it was titled in
the name of the Family Trust and the taxes were owed by Douglas and·his wife.
The court held that Douglas and Barbara were the beneficial owners of the cabin,
because Douglas had a purchase-money resulting tmst arising from his having
bought the cabin and then conveyed it to the tmst.
The .U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit (Judge Hartz) affim1ed,
by a two-to-one vote. The court noted that when Douglas created the Family
Trust, his finances were already in a precarious state. Douglas owed almost
$350,000 in income taxes for 1993 and filed no return. The next year he was sued
by investors and the year after he was indicted for fmancial transgressions, but the
claims and charges concerned misconduct beginning in late 1990. Douglas retai1Ied significant control over the Family Trust's affairs: Tingey consulted with
Douglas and relied on Douglas's knowledge of the investment industry in making
decisions regarding trust assets, Douglas often presented Tingey with investment
opportunities for the trust, and the trust was intimately intertwined with Douglas's
business affairs. Tingey argued that (1) that the government waived the right to
assert that Douglas and Barbara held the beneficial interest in the cabin, and (2)
no purchase money resulting trust was created under state law. The court rejected both arguments. -:r:he court held that there was no waiver, despite the stipulated
order in Douglas's criminal securities-fraud case, that required that the proceeds
of certain stock held by the Family Trust be forfeited to the United States as restitution, and that lifted any further restraint on remaining trust property: Even if the
government was fully aware of the Family Ttust's claims to the cabin, its agreement to the stipulated order did not waive its rights to pursue a tax claim, because
the order said nothing about tax liability or who had beneficial interests in the
cabin. The court also held that there was a valid purchase money resulting trust
under state law, noting that a purchase money resulting trust usually arises where
a transfer of properties is made to one person and the purchase price is paid by
another. Zion's First Nat'l Bank v. Fennmore (In re Estate of Hock), 655 P.2d
1111 at 1115 (Utah 1982) (quoting Restatement (Second) of Trusts§ 440 (1959));
accord Restatement (Third) of Trusts § 9(1) (2003). There is an exception where
the transfer of property is made to donor's close family, as happened here, unless
the one paying the purchase price intends that the transferee should have no bene-
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ficial interest in the property. In this case, the court stated that the record showed
that Douglas, with the trustee's acquiescence, ignored the formalities of the trust
in managing the property, making note payments out of personal funds that were
not routed through the trust, taking care of maintenance, paying insurance premiums (on a policy that was in Douglas's name), and renting out the cabin without
the trustee's knowledge. Douglas had as much control ofthe property as he would
have had if it had been in his own name, and he kept the title to the water rights in
his name, malting the trust's asset unmarketable. Douglas lmew when he created
the trust that he was accnring significant ta,"{ and civil liabilities, and he created
the trust for asset protection purposes. An intent to shield assets from creditors
can support the imposition of a pmchase money resulting trust.
Chief Judge Br~scoe dissented, finding that the govenunent had not met its
bmden to produce "clear and convincing" evidence that Douglas intended to retain a beneficial interest in the cabin. The Chief Judge stated that he would reverse and remand for further proceedings to determine if the IRS can enforce a
lien tmder its altemate theory of fraudulent transfer, which the district comt did
not address. The Chief Judge argued that the purchase money resulting trust is
not an eqtritable remedy designed to benefit creditors, but rather a remedy designed to give effect to the purchaser's intent, and that the fact that Douglas made
payments on the note cannot serve as evidence to rebut the presumption that Barbara and the couple's children held the beneficial interest. Rather, he contended,
the trustee 1s co-signing the note supports the view that the Family Trust was the
true beneficial owner, and that the parties anticipated that the trust would make
future payments. An intent to protect assets from creditors is a factor in detennining whether we should impose a purchase money revocable trust, the Chief Judge
agreed, but it is not the only factor. "[A] pmchaser could quite plausibly want to
protect his assets and gift the property to Iris relatives." 2013 WL 2321656 at* 12.
The Chief Judge stated that the evidence supporting a conclusion that Douglas intended to retain a beneficial interest is ambiguous as to intent. There was no evidence that the beneficiaries were unaware of their interest in the cabin, or that
Douglas used it for his own purposes to the exclusion of the beneficiaries. Furthermore, the trustee had long considered the cabin a trust asset, and Barbara and
the children used the cabin for their own enjoyment. Also, none of the parties with
knowledge of this transaction· has made an assertion explicitly contradicting the
presumption that Douglas intended the cabin as a gift for his wife and the children.
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